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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The above entitled appeal is from an order of dismissal with 
prejudice, which was granted by the First Judicial District Court, 
Box Elder County, State of Utah, in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff 
filed this appeal on December 6, 1991, pursuant to the provisions 
of Article VIII § 3 of the Constitution of Utah, U.C.A. § 78-2-2, 
and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, after a 
thirty (30) day extension to file the Notice of Appeal was granted 
on November 6, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting 
Defendant's Motion in Limine, or in the alternative, by denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance while granting Defendant's 
Motion in Limine? The standard of review for this issue is a 
review of the appropriateness of the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P. 2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 
1976); Reeves v. Geiqy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 
(Ct. App. Utah 1988). The standard for reviewing whether the 
trial court has properly exercised its discretion is the 
following: 
. . . where the lower tribunal, acting within the scope 
of its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at 
a decision, the reviewing court will examine only the 
certified record; and will not interfere with matters 
of discretion or upset the actions of the lower 
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tribunal except upon a showing that the tribunal acted 
in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly 
outside reason that its action must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Salt Lake Ctv, 555 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah 1976) (footnotes omitted), 
(2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, based upon a 
procedural defect, thereby depriving her of her right to trial by 
jury and to have her claim adjudicated on the merits? The 
standard of review for this issue is a review of the appropriate-
ness of the exercise of the trial court's discretion. Bambrough, 
552 P.2d at 1290; Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639. The standard of 
reviewing whether the trial court has properly exercised its 
discretion is the following: 
... where the lower tribunal, acting within the scope 
of its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at 
a decision, the reviewing court will examine only the 
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the actions of the lower tribunal 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside 
reason that its action must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary. 
Peatross, 555 P.2d at 284. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
"The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution 
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties." Rule 
38(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This is a medical malpractice action brought by Plaintiff 
against Defendant for negligent dental treatment of Plaintiff 
between February of 1986 and April of 1988. (R. at 001-010.) 
II. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On March 8, 1990, Plaintiff filed this dental malpractice 
action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's treatment of 
Plaintiff's teeth, and Defendant's failure to refer Plaintiff to 
a specialist during the two year period of treatment, constituted 
dental malpractice. (R. at 001-010.) This action was initially 
scheduled for trial to commence on April 10, 1991. (R. at 063-
065.) However, when Plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Steve Larsen, 
reneged on his agreement to be her expert on the eve of trial, the 
lower court granted Plaintiff's first Motion for Continuance on 
April 9, 1991, continuing the trial to August 26, 1991. (R. at 
161, 234.) 
On August 14, 1991, Defendant refused to stipulate to an 
additional short continuance, after Plaintiff learned that her 
preferred expert, Dr. George Bagwell, would not be available on 
August 26, 1991. (R. at 230.) On August 19, 1991, by facsimile 
transmission to Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff designated Dr. 
Hollin Hiller, her second choice for expert witness. (R. at 230.) 
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In spite of the fact that both experts had been generally 
identified at the hearing on April 9, 1991, Defendant objected to 
Plaintiff's designation and moved the court in limine for an order 
precluding Plaintiff from calling Dr. Hiller as an expert witness 
at trial. (R. at 174-183, 235.) 
The hearing on the Motion in Limine was initiated in a 
telephone conference with the lower court at the Circuit Court 
chambers of Judge West in Ogden, Utah, on August 23, 1991, the 
audio tape of which was subsequently lost or misplaced. (R. at 
235; absence of transcript of August 23, 1991, hearing as part of 
the record.) In that telephone conference, Plaintiff's counsel 
also moved the court for a short continuance of the trial date to 
allow Defendant time to formally depose Dr. Hiller. Although the 
court reserved its ruling until the following Monday, the first 
day of trial, the court encouraged the parties to settle and 
encouraged Defendant's counsel to conduct the deposition of Dr. 
Hiller by telephone; however, Defendant's counsel chose not to do 
so. (R. at 235.) 
III. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On the morning of trial, August 26, 1991, the court below 
granted Defendant's Motion in Limine and denied Plaintiff's Motion 
for Continuance. The lower court further dismissed this action 
with prejudice, based upon the lack of any expert testimony. (R. 
at 203-219.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Between February of 1986 and April of 1988, Defendant 
performed root canals on two of Plaintiff's teeth. Beginning in 
March of 1986, Plaintiff began having irritation and pain in the 
first tooth in which a root canal was preformed in February of 
1986. (R. at 002-003, 121-122.) 
2. Over the next two years, Plaintiff had continual pain 
and other problems with this tooth. Defendant continued to 
prescribe Penicillin VK to Plaintiff intermittently over that two 
year period. In January of 1988, Defendant also initiated a 
second root canal on a second tooth, which also caused irritation 
and pain to Plaintiff. (R. at 003, 121-122.) 
3. In April of 1988, upon the recommendation of her 
gynecologist, Dr. Parkinson, Plaintiff terminated her treatment by 
Defendant and sought assistance from Dr. Steve Larsen, an 
endodontist, and Dr. Stewart Wilkinson, an oral surgeon. (R. at 
004, 122.) 
4. On March 8, 1990, Plaintiff filed this dental malpractice 
action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's treatment of 
Plaintiff's teeth, and Defendant's failure to refer Plaintiff to a 
specialist during the two year period of treatment, constituted 
dental malpractice. This matter was initially scheduled for 
trial to commence on April 10, 1991. (R. at 001-010, 063-065.) 
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5. No formal discovery, including depositions, 
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or request 
for admissions, was ever conducted in this action. (R. at 001-
289. ) 
6. In preparation for trial of this matter, Walter Merrill, 
from the office of counsel for Plaintiff, met with Dr. Steve 
Larsen and discussed with him Plaintiff's desire to hire him as 
her expert witness. Dr. Larsen quoted $250.00 per hour for in-
court testimony and agreed to be Plaintiff's expert. Plaintiff's 
counsel then designated Dr. Larsen as Plaintiff's expert, although 
such designation was due approximately one month earlier. 
However, Defendant's Expert Witness List was due March 8, 1991, 
but was not provided until April 19, 1991, a month and a half 
late. (R. at 067-069, 072-074, 228-229.) 
7. On April 4, 1991, Douglas Durbano, Plaintiff's counsel, 
visited with Dr. Larsen by telephone concerning his testimony at 
the coming trial. Dr. Larsen confirmed to counsel that the 
standard of care had been breached, not only in the actual 
performance of the root canals, but also in the failure to refer 
Plaintiff out to a specialist within the first 6 months of 
treatment. Dr. Larsen indicated for the first time that he was 
concerned about the effect his expert testimony might have on 
future referrals from dentists in his community. The conversation 
was concluded with the understanding that counsel would contact 
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Dr. Larsen once more the first of the following week concerning 
the scheduling of his testimony at the trial. (R. at 233-234.) 
8. On April 5, 1991, Dr. Larsen called Mr. Durbano's office 
but, in his absence, talked with Mr. Merrill. Dr. Larsen stated 
to Mr. Merrill that he simply could not be Plaintiff's expert in 
this matter. Mr. Merrill immediately went to work to find a 
substitute expert and located one in Durango, Colorado, Dr. George 
Bagwell, and another in Idaho Falls, Idaho, Dr. Hollin Hiller. 
However, both experts needed more notice than Plaintiff could 
provide with the trial to commence on April 10, 1991. (R. at 
229. ) 
9. Plaintiff immediately made a motion before the trial 
court for a continuance of the trial date, which motion was heard 
before the Honorable Judge Newey on April 9, 1991. The lower 
court found that to commence the trial of this matter on April 10, 
1991, under the circumstances would be prejudicial to Plaintiff 
and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. The trial was 
continued until August 26, 1991. Plaintiff's counsel informed 
Defense counsel, in open court, of her two potential expert 
witnesses and the trial court ordered the parties to exchange new 
witness lists, identifying their expert witnesses, within 10 days 
after the hearing. (R. at 161, 234.) 
10. After the hearing on April 9, 1991, the parties entered 
into concentrated settlement negotiations, pursuant to which the 
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parties agreed that Plaintiff would not need to designate which of 
the two experts she would be using until failure of the 
negotiation efforts. A confirming letter was sent to counsel for 
Defendant on April 24, 1991, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Walter T. Merrill. (R. at 229, 
287. ) 
11. Pursuant to the settlement negotiations, a mediation 
conference was conducted at Western Arbitration on June 28, 1991. 
However, the mediation conference was unsuccessful in producing a 
settlement of this matter. (R. at 234.) 
12. In an effort to reduce the cost of an expert, 
Plaintiff's counsel attempted to find a local expert during the 
next several weeks after the mediation conference. However, all 
dentists contacted by Plaintiff's counsel refused to be the expert 
witness for Plaintiff. (R. at 229.) 
13. Having had no success in finding a local expert, and 
with the settlement prospects becoming more unlikely, counsel for 
Plaintiff contacted Dr. Bagwell, Plaintiff's preferred expert, on 
August 12, 1991, to confirm his availability. However, although 
Dr. Bagwell had stated before that he only required 10 days 
notice, Dr. Bagwell was not available on the dates scheduled for 
the trial of this matter, starting on August 26, 1991. Although 
counsel for Plaintiff attempted immediately, he was not able to 
contact Defendant's counsel until August 14, 1991, to communicate 
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that Dr. Bagwell, identified earlier as the expert from Durango, 
Colorado, would not be available on the scheduled trial dates. 
Plaintiff's counsel requested that counsel for Defendant stipulate 
to a short continuance until Dr. Bagwell would be available, but 
Defendant's counsel denied the request and stated for the first 
time that it was too late to designate an expert and that he would 
object to any designation of an expert witness. (R. at 230.) 
14. On August 15, 1991, Plaintiff's counsel contacted Dr. 
Hiller, the expert previously identified from Idaho Falls, to 
discuss his availability. Upon ascertaining Dr. Hiller's 
availability, Plaintiff's counsel revised the witness list and 
telefaxed the revised list with a cover letter to counsel for 
Defendant on August 19, 1991, a copy of which is attached at 
Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Walter T. Merrill. Plaintiff's 
counsel stated that Dr. Hiller would be available for deposition 
anytime that week. (R. at 171-173, 230, 288.) 
15. Plaintiff's counsel telefaxed a second letter to 
Defendant's counsel on August 22, 1991, attached as Exhibit "C" to 
the Affidavit of Walter T. Merrill, identifying what Dr. Hiller's 
testimony would be at trial, and again stating his availability 
for interview or deposition. (R. at 230-231, 289; absence of 
transcript of August 23, 1991, hearing as part of the record.) 
16. Defendant objected to Plaintiff's witness list and 
moved the trial court in Limine for an order precluding Plaintiff 
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from calling Dr. Hiller as an expert witness at trial. The 
hearing on the Motion in Limine was initiated in a telephone 
conference with the lower court, at the Circuit Court chambers of 
Judge West, who was presiding due to the illness of Judge Gunnell, 
on August 23, 1991, the audio tape of which was subsequently lost 
or misplaced. In that telephone conference, counsel for Plaintiff 
also moved the trial court for a short continuance of the trial 
date. Although Judge West reserved his ruling until the following 
Monday, the first day of trial, he did state in the telephone 
conference that Plaintiff needed an expert witness, that 
continuance of the trial was unlikely, and he encouraged the 
parties to settle the matter and encouraged counsel for Defendant 
to depose Dr. Hiller by telephone; however, Defendant's counsel 
chose not to do so. (R. at 174-183, 235; absence of transcript of 
August 23, 1991, hearing as part of the record.) 
17. The hearing on Defendant's Motion in Limine and 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance was concluded the morning of 
trial, August 26, 1991, at which time the trial court made the 
following findings: 
(a) that Plaintiff was in need of an expert in order to 
establish the standard of care in a case of this nature; 
(b) that the need for an expert was clear and obvious from 
the beginning; 
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(c) that designation of the expert witness to be used by 
Plaintiff on August 19, 1991, created extreme prejudice to 
Defendant; 
(d) that without notice to the trial court, the parties could 
not agree to deviate from the order of the lower court requiring 
expert witnesses to be designated within 10 days after the hearing 
in April; 
(e) that upon designation of Plaintiff's expert, Defendant 
desired to take the expert's deposition and was encouraged by the 
trial court to do so, but refused to do so on the basis of lack of 
time; 
(f) that all through this action, there had been no formal 
discovery; 
(g) that if Plaintiff were to go forward with her evidence 
without an expert, the trial court would direct a verdict in favor 
of Defendant; and 
(h) that the trial in this matter has been continued once and 
that Judge West was unsure how many times to continue the trial of 
this matter. 
The trial court then granted Defendant's Motion in Limine and 
denied Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance. Judge West further 
dismissed this action with prejudice, based on the lack of any 
expert testimony. (R. at 191-202, 203-219.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance while granting Defendants 
Motion in Limine. The lower court's denial of the Motion for 
Continuance was based in part upon the fact that the trial had 
been continued once before. However, the prior continuance was 
not based upon any fault of Plaintiff or her counsel and should 
not have been a consideration in the Judge's ruling on her second 
Motion for Continuance. The trial court, in denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Continuance, ruled that without notice to the lower 
court, the parties could not agree to deviate from a prior order 
of the trial court requiring designation of expert witnesses by 
April 19, 1992. This ruling is inconsistent with the law and 
requires reversal of the Order entered October 7, 1991. 
The Order should also be reversed because the trial court 
failed to recognize the exception to the requirement of expert 
testimony, which exception should have been applied to the case at 
bar. Reversal of the trial court's Order is also supported by 
Defendant's conduct in reaching an agreement that Plaintiff's 
expert would not need to be designated until negotiations failed, 
and continuing to loll Plaintiff into that impression, while 
Defendant intended to deny any such agreement before the lower 
court. Based upon a prior ruling of this Court, the trial court 
should have denied Defendant's Motion in Limine, precluding expert 
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testimony on behalf of Plaintiff. For all of the reasons stated 
herein, the Order entered October 7, 1991 should be reversed. 
In dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, the lower court has 
denied Plaintiff her right to a trial by jury and her right to 
have her claim adjudicated on the merits. However, the conduct of 
the parties throughout the proceedings of this lawsuit precludes 
such a harsh and permanent remedy. For that reason, the lower 
court's Order entered October 7, 1991, should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance While Granting 
Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
While the trial court has substantial discretion in deciding 
whether to grant continuances, in making such determination, the 
trial court must act reasonably. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). If the action of the trial court is 
deemed capricious or arbitrary, the trial court's order must be 
reversed. Peatross, 555 P. 2d at 284. It has been held that 
M[d]enial of a motion for continuance constitutes an abuse of 
discretion 'when a party has been deprived of a substantial right 
or seriously prejudiced.'" Siggelkow v. Siqqelkow, 643 P.2d 985, 
986-87 (Alaska 1982) (citation omitted). In the case at bar, the 
trial court's Order dated October 7, 1991, has deprived Plaintiff 
of her substantial right of not only trial by jury but also to 
have her claim adjudicated on the merits. The extreme prejudice 
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which this Order has caused Plaintiff requires reversal of the 
trial court's Order. Id. 
The trial court's denial of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance was based at least in part upon a finding that the 
trial had been continued once and Judge West didn't know how many 
more times he could continue it. (R. at 217.) However, the first 
continuance of the trial in this matter was not due to either 
Plaintiff's negligence or her counsel's lack of preparation. 
Plaintiff had made firm arrangements with Dr. Steve Larsen to be 
her expert witness in this action. It was only when Dr. Larsen 
reneged on his agreement on the eve of trial that Plaintiff was 
forced to move for a continuance, which Motion was communicated to 
the office of Defendant's counsel the same day Dr. Larsen reneged. 
The Honorable Judge Newey, sitting on the bench at the time, 
agreed that the loss of her expert was not Plaintiff's doing, 
found that to commence the trial the following day under the 
circumstances would be prejudicial to Plaintiff, and therefore, 
granted Plaintiff's first Motion for Continuance. Because Judge 
West's denial of Plaintiff's second Motion for Continuance was 
based upon the fact that the trial had been continued once before, 
the Order entered October 7, 1991, dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice, should be reversed. 
Although the order of the trial court pursuant to the hearing 
on April 9, 1991, required the parties to exchange expert witness 
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lists within 10 days after the hearing, as a result of 
concentrated settlement negotiations, the parties agreed that 
Plaintiff would not need to designate which of the two experts 
identified at the hearing she would be using, until the settlement 
negotiations failed. A confirming letter was sent to Defendant's 
counsel on April 24, 1991, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the Affidavit of Walter T. Merrill. (R. at 287.) Defen-
dant made no reference to this agreement or the confirming letter 
throughout the proceeding below, apparently hoping the trial court 
would ignore the arrangement, which it did. However, attorneys 
have the implied authority and authorization to enter into 
stipulations and agreements with opposing counsel respecting 
matters of procedure. In Interest of Holt, 625 P. 2d 398, 401 
(Idaho 1981); In re Adoption of Coqqins, 537 P.2d 287, 290 (Ct. 
App. Wash. 1975); Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 762 (Cal. 1969); 7 
Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 150. 
Since the order, requiring the parties to designate expert 
witnesses within 10 days of the April hearing, was purely 
procedural in nature, the agreement that Plaintiff need not 
designate her expert witness until settlement negotiations had 
failed was a valid and enforceable agreement between the parties. 
However, in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance concerning 
the second trial date, the lower ruled that without notice to the 
lower court, the parties could not agree to deviate from the order 
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of the trial court requiring expert witnesses to be designated 
within 10 days after the April hearing, (R. at 216.) This 
ruling is totally inconsistent with the law, is an abuse of 
discretion, and requires the reversal of the trial court's Order 
entered October 7, 1991. 
The trial court's denial of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance was also based upon a finding that Plaintiff's need 
for an expert to establish the standard of care was clear and 
obvious from the beginning. Although this is the general rule, 
this Court has carved out an exception to that rule, that if the 
jury finds that the propriety of the treatment received is within 
their common knowledge and experience, they may rely on their own 
ideas concerning the standard of care and whether Defendant 
complied with that standard. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 
(Utah 1980). Plaintiff has always contended that Defendant's 
failure to refer Plaintiff to a specialist within no more than six 
months after commencement of treatment is such on obvious breach 
of the standard of care that it falls within the exception created 
in Nixdorf. The trial court's failure to recognize this exception 
also serves as a basis upon which the Order entered October 7, 
1991, should be reversed. 
The conduct of the parties prior to August 26, 1991, also 
supports reversal of the dismissal below. When Dr. Larsen reneged 
on his agreement on the eve of trial, Plaintiff's counsel 
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frantically searched for a substitute expert. At the April 
hearing, Plaintiff's counsel reported to the trial court that he 
had located two possible experts, one in Durango, Colorado, and 
another in Idaho Falls, Idaho, although neither could prepare in 
time for trail. Thus, Defendant knew since April 9, 1991, that 
Plaintiff would be designating one of these two experts when such 
designation was required. Plaintiff did not designate which 
expert she would retain within 10 days of the April hearing, 
pursuant to the agreement between the parties discussed above. 
Defendant's counsel argued at the August hearing that the 
designation of Plaintiff's expert was triggered when the mediation 
conference held on June 28, 1991, failed to produce a settlement. 
However, the mediation conference was only part of the settlement 
negotiation efforts and was not the culmination of such efforts. 
Whether or not this was Defendant's understanding, the 
understanding was never communicated to Plaintiff and Plaintiff 
continued, even after the mediation conference, to labor under 
the impression that the designation of her expert witness was not 
yet required. If Defendant believed that the agreement terminated 
at the end of June, Defendant should have demanded at that time 
that Plaintiff designate her expert, rather than continue to lull 
Plaintiff into the impression that designation of her expert 
witness was still not required. 
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As the second trial date approached, on August 12, 1991, two 
weeks prior to trial, Plaintiff's counsel contacted the previously 
identified expert in Durango, Colorado, Dr. George Bagwell, who 
was Plaintiff's preferred expert. However, although Dr. Bagwell 
had previously stated that he only required 10 days notice, Dr. 
Bagwell was not available on the dates scheduled for the trial of 
this matter, starting on August 26, 1991. Although counsel for 
Plaintiff attempted immediately, he was not able to contact 
Defendant's counsel until August 14, 1991 concerning Dr. Bagwell's 
unavailability. Plaintiff's counsel requested that Defendant's 
counsel stipulate to a short continuance until Dr. Bagwell would 
be available, but Defendant's counsel refused to do so and stated 
for the first time that he would object to any designation of an 
expert witness. 
On August 15, 1991, Plaintiff's counsel contacted Dr. Hiller, 
the expert previously identified from Idaho Falls, to discuss his 
availability. Upon ascertaining Dr. Hiller's availability, 
Plaintiff's counsel revised the expert witness list and trans-
mitted by facsimile the revised list with a cover letter to 
Defendant's counsel on August 19, 1991, seven days before trial. 
Plaintiff's counsel stated in the letter that Dr. Hiller was 
available for deposition any time that week. (R. at 288.) The 
trial court later also urged Defendant's counsel to depose Dr. 
Hiller. However, Defendant's counsel flatly refused to do so. 
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This Court has already ruled that it was not an abuse of 
discretion for a trial court to allow testimony of an expert who 
is designated only five days before trial, but who was made 
available for interview or deposition, when the other party 
simply chose not to take advantage of either option. Christenson, 
761 P. 2d at 1377-78- Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court's 
grant of Defendant's Motion in Limine, disallowing any testimony 
from Dr. Hiller, can be viewed as an abuse of discretion in and of 
itself. Ld. However, the granting of Defendant's Motion in 
Limine, in combination with the denial of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance, was a clear abuse of discretion, supporting reversal 
of the trial court's Order entered October 7, 1991. In addition, 
lack of a complete record, due to the transcript of the August 23, 
1991, hearing being lost or misplaced, provides additional support 
for the reversal of the Order. 
II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Dismissing 
this Action with Prejudice. 
"The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution 
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties." Rule 
38(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court should have 
done everything possible to insure Plaintiff's right to have a 
jury determine the factual issues of her claim, which is one in 
law. Corbet v. Cox, 517 P.2d 1318, 1319-20 (Utah 1974). 
Throughout the proceedings of this lawsuit, neither party 
conducted formal discovery, including depositions, interroga-
19 
tories, requests for production of documents, or requests for 
admissions. This was done in a mutual effort to keep costs at a 
minimum in the hopes of effectuating a settlement. 
The lower court's ruling that Defendant's right to depose 
Plaintiff's expert should be enforced did not take into account 
the past conduct of the parties, including the agreement 
concerning designation of Plaintiff's expert. The trial court 
simply did not have the adequate grounds necessary "to apply the 
harsh and permanent remedy' of a dismissal with prejudice." 
Intermountain Phv. Med, v. Micro-Dex, 739 P.2d L131, 1133 ( Ct. 
App. Utah 1987) (citation omitted). In the absence of any 
significant prejudice to Defendant, and to prevent devastating 
prejudice to Plaintiff, the trial court should not have dismissed 
this action with prejudice. The trial court's dismissal of this 
action with prejudice was an abuse of discretion and should be 
reversed by this Court. 
20 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respectfully 
requests the Utah Supreme Court to reverse the Order of the trial 
court denying her Motion for Continuance and dismissing this 
action with prejudice, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J-C" day of March, 1992. 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
DOUGLAS M. DURBXlfo 
WALTER T. MERRILL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT to David G. Williams, Terence 
L. Rooney, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, #10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145, postage pre-
paid on this yL j> day of March, 1992. 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
DOUGLAS M. DURBMO 
WALTER T. MERRIX.L 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
(l\pldgs\880598.BRF) 
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ADDENDUM A 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS - A3481 
TERENCE L. ROONEY - A57 89 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GINA M. HILL, 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 900000135 PI 
DR. CARL DICKERSON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for trial on August 26, 1991 at 10:00 a.m. 
before the Court, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. 
Defendants Objection to Plaintifffs witness List and Motion in 
Limine dated August 22, 1991 was heard by the Court on August 23, 
1991 by telephone conference hearing and again on August 26, 1991 
at the commencement of trial. The Court, after hearing argument 
from the parties and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the 
parties, finds that the designation of new fact witnesses and the 
designation of an expert witness by plaintiff on August 19, 1991, 
was untimely and in violation of this Court's Order dated April 29, 
1991. The Court further finds that defendant would be seriously 
prejudiced if the witnesses first identified by plaintiff on August 
19, 1991 were allowed to testify. 
At the commencement of trial, plaintiff advised the Court that 
in view of the Court's ruling granting defendant's Motion in 
Limine, plaintiff would not have an expert witness at trial and 
could not offer any expert testimony. The Court found that the 
issues presented in this case regarding the applicable standard of 
care, whether the standard of care was breached and causation are 
not within the common knowledge or experience of lay persons and 
expert testimony would therefore be required for plaintiff to make 
a prima facie case which could be submitted to the jury. 
Therefore, without waiving any rights with respect to the Court's 
rulings, plaintiff suggested and agreed that the Court should 
dismiss the case rather than have plaintiff present her case 
without expert testimony and then direct a verdict against her. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Witness List is 
sustained and his Motion in Limine dated August 22, 1991 is 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff's oral motion for continuance made on August 
26, 1991 at the commencement of trial is denied. 
3. This matter is dismissed with prejudice based on the lack 
of any expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of 
care, any breach of the applicable standard of care or, injury 
caused by a breach of the applicable standard of care. 
-2-
4. Defendant is awarded costs in the sum of $ 
DATED this 7 day of d) est , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
W. Brent West 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATRICIA C. WHITE, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Defendant herein; that she served the attached ORDER (Case Number 
900000135 PI, First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Paul H. Johnson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3340 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on 
the day of August, 1991. 
JU 
Patricia C. white 
-H~. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this p?7 day of August, 
1991 
My Commission Expires 
' '- ; i / / L / 
NOTJARY PUBLIC 
\ o \ -"•*•;-
Residing in the State_of Utah 
I:;":-'If, fh]Z\ •iftlt UI-.C <-<!•/. - .' -
STATE OIr UTAH^ 
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ADDENDUM B 
uy rir 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GINA M. HILL 
Plaintiff 
vs 
DR. CARL DICKERSON. 
De f endan t 
Civil No. 900000135 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of August, 
1991. the above-referenced matter came on for trial in 
the Box Elder County Courthouse, 01 South Main, 
Brigham City, Utah, commencing at the hour of 11:00 
o'clock a.m., the Honorable W . Brent West presiding. 
APPEARANCES : 
For the Plaintiff : DOUGLAS M. DURBANO 
Attorney at Law 
Harrison Professional Plaza 
3340 Harrison Blvd. 
Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
For the Defendant: DAVID G. WILLIAMS 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Newhouse Building 
#10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
01 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
1 I THE CLERK: Case number 900000135. Gina M. Hill 
2 vs. Dr. Carl Dickerson. Counsel, please state your 
3 I appearances for the record. 
4 MR. DURBANO: Douglas M. Durbano, appearing for 
5 the plaintiff. 
6 MR. WILLIAMS: David J. Williams of Snow, 
7 Christensen & Martineau for Dr. Dickerson, the 
3 de f endan t. 
9 THE COURT: This is the time set for trial. I'd 
10 first like to address the ladies and gentlemen called 
11 here for jury service. I appreciate you being here. 
12 I know it was somewhat of a short notice to make your 
13 appearance here this morning to help us in resolving 
14 this particular case. I appreciate you taking your 
15 time to do tha t . 
16 it will not be necessary for us to keep 
17 you any later here this morning. I've been called 
18 upon to make a decision on a legal matter and I have 
19 ruled on that and we're going to put that on the 
20 record here this morning. The net effect of my ruling 
21 will be to take this case away from the necessity of 
22 being tried today and move it along on the channels of 
23 justice as it goes forward. 
24 I understand, Mr. Bailiff, they have all 
25 been paid and taken care of. 
1 I MR. BAILIFF: No, sir. They'll get the pay as 
2 they go out. 
3 | THE COURT: Okay. Clerk, I don't know, is there 
4 a possibility they'll be called again? 
5 | THE CLERK: Because they've made an appearance 
6 I they will be excused and are finished for this term. 
7 THE COURT: This will complete your jury service, 
S even though you didn't actually get to sit as a jury. 
> 
9 Your being here means you won't be called again on the 
10 next rotation. You are all excused with my heartfelt 
11 thanks and I appreciate you being here this morning. 
12 I hope we didn't break up your day too badly. Thank 
1 3 you. 
14 (All prospective jurors out of the courtroom.) 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Durbano, Mr. Williams, that 
16 brings us to the matter now that we need to make a 
17 record about. Since last Friday, when we had a 
18 conference call, we've been discussing the issue of 
19 whether or not plaintiff in this particular case 
20 timely complied with Judge Gunnell's, or Judge Kewey's 
21 order, in regards to disclosure of expert witnesses 
22 and witnesses in preparation for this trial. 
23 According to the order that was signed by 
24 I the judge, all discovery and notification of witnesses-
25 ! in this case was supposed to have been complied with 
1 clear back in April. I believe it was within ten days 
2 after. Let me look at it. 
3 Yes. I show that on the 8th day of 
4 I January 1991, Judge Gunnell made an order indicating 
5 that plaintiff needed to supply her expert witness 
6 J list to the defendant by February 8th, 1991, and the 
7 I defendant was to provide his expert witness list by 
8 March 8th, 1991. 
9 My understanding is that on August 19th, 
10 four days — actually, a week prior to the trial date, 
11 but four days prior to when we had our hearing, the 
12 defendant was notified in fact that the plaintiff had 
13 selected an expert and was going to ask that that 
14 I expert be allowed to testify here in the trial. 
15 MR. DUR3ANO: Could I clarify one point for the 
16 record? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. DURBANO: The actual order that I think the 
19 judge wants — the court wants to refer to is the one 
20 that was granted in August. The order in January was 
21 complied with. We identified one of the treating 
22 physicians as the expert witness and it was the day 
23 before trial that that treating physician became 
24 I reluctant and indicated his unwillingness to testify 
25 i and so we asked for a continuance and the court 
1 I granted us ten days to appoint a second expert 
2 | witness. 
3 I THE COURT: That was in April? 
4 MR. DURBANO: Yes, April. I'm sorry, I said 
5 I Augus t. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Durbano submitted hi 
7 list on behalf of the plaintiff, the expert witnesses 
3 and Mr. Williams, on behalf of the defense, filed an 
9 objection. Mr. Durbano filed a response to the 
10 objection and you argued that to me on Friday. 
11 I gave you my feeling Friday, in the 
12 telephone conference call that we had, that, one, I 
13 was of the opinion that the plaintiff was in need of 
14 an expert in order to establish the standard of care 
15 in a case of this nature: two, to me it was clear and 
16 obvious from the beginning that an expert would be 
17 necessary in this particular case; three, I felt that 
18 there was extreme prejudice by the late notice or 
19 indication of an expert. It was also clear to me tha 
20 in their discussions and in their conversations both 
21 counsel indicated that once the plaintiff identified 
22 their expert that the defendant did want to engage in 
23 formal discovery. 
24 Mr. Durbano, in fairness to your side of 
25 the case, I am also aware that all through this case 
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there has been little or no depositions and that 
discovery has been of an informal nature. 
I'll now give each counsel an opportunity 
to address the issue and make any record that you 
would like to make on this case, starting first with 
Mr. Durbano . 
MR. DURBANO: Thank you, Your Honor. I 
appreciate the opportunity because, as the court has 
noted, without the ability to call an expert witness 
for today's trial, the court has indicated in 
chambers, at least, that it would be inclined to grant 
a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case, 
essentially eliminating the need for a trial. That, 
therefore, is the basis of our decision to allow the 
court to dismiss ,the jury and not go forward with the 
test imony. 
I would point out to the court that in our 
last conversation, and I believe it was on the record, 
is that correct, last Friday's conversation? 
THE COURT: That was taped. 
MR. DURBANO: On the record the court encouraged 
the defendant to take the telephone deposition of Dr. 
Hiller to avoid any potential surprise. I would 
indicate that the defense counsel chose not to and 
25 I thus came to court today knowing that he was not going 
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to take the deposition of Dr. Hiller, notwithstanding 
that he did have the opportunity and we did make Dr. 
Hiller available. 
I would point out that on April 24th, 
1991 ; there was an exchange of correspondence between 
our office and Mr. Williams's office where we 
confirmed that the hiring by both parties of an expert 
witness would be waived at that time, based upon the 
parties having finally initiated settlement 
negotiations and were entering into an arbitration or 
mediation effort, so that no expert witnesses would be 
required until complete failure of our negotiation 
efforts, as the letter states. At this date I still 
do not know when complete failure of the negotiations 
occurred. We were negotiating up to and including 
today 
I think that the defendant in this case 
has always known, based upon Judge Newey's previous 
ruling, that the plaintiff intended to call either an 
expert from Colorado, which was the original expert 
designated at the hearing, who would possibly be 
available for trial, or in the alternative that Dr. 
Hiller would be called from Idaho if the expert from 
Colorado was unavailable. As trial got closer it 
became evident that Dr. Killer's schedule would 
1 J accommodate better the trial setting and Dr. Hiller 
2 was selected and we notified defense counsel of that 
3 selection. 
4 I I don't believe it came as a surprise. I 
5 believe that defense counsel and the defendant has 
6 known all along that we would anticipate calling an 
7 expert, based upon the previous ruling of the court 
8 that an expert would be required. 
9 J Therefore, while I recognize the court has 
10 J indicated that it might be prejudicial to the 
11 defendant because they have not had an opportunity to 
12 I depose the expert, I believe that the prejudice must 
13 1 be borne by the defendant and that if they have not 
14 done so it's because of their own waiver or failure to 
15 do so. 
16 I To perfectly clear up the record, not only 
17 has there not been any depositions in this case, there 
18 have never been any formal interrogatories, requests 
19 for admissions or requests for production of 
20 documents. The entire case has been handled 
21 informally, until the eleventh hour when the defendant 
22 now insists upon a formal deposition of the 
23 plaintiff's expert. 
24 Last but not least, while it may be 
25 prejudicial, and I underline the word may, for the 
1 I defendant not to have deposed Dr. Hiller, for us to be 
2 | precluded from having an expert is more than 
3 | prejudicial, it defeats our entire case. 
With that, I would again urge the court to 
grant either a motion for continuance, which I would 
make right now, and allow this case to be heard at a 
later date when the defendant has had an opportunity 
to depose Dr. Hiller, or in the alternative ask the 
court to reconsider its in chambers motion and order 
that the plaintiff be allowed to put on her testimony 
including the expert witness Dr. Hiller. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Williams. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. Our motion 
was filed the very day that I received the designation 
of expert witness and, I might note, six additional 
fact witnesses who had never been identified in any 
form prior to the witness list dated August 19th. We 
acted within one day, and that was two business days 
before trial that I received the names of an expert 
witness and six additional fact witnesses. 
Addressing counsel's points about 
discovery, when this case was in the early stages 
plaintiff indicated she were not going to call an 
expert witness in this case. We indicated to them 
1 I that if they didn't we wouldn't and we would both rely 
2 I on the treating dentist. That's why no formal 
3 I discovery was done. We both were able to talk with 
4 the treating dentist. We had meetings with each other 
5 to hear what the parties were going to say. 
6 But once the plaintiff indicated she would 
7 call an expert witness it was made known clearly that 
8 we would require a formal deposition of that expert 
9 witness. Counsel has not denied that, I don't 
10 believe. No one disputes that. That's when we were 
11 here in court before Judge Newey, when the plaintiff 
12 sought the first continuance in this case just one day 
13 before trial, I think. We'd prepared and were ready 
14 to go to trial and the plaintiff came in and wanted a 
15 continuance. Judge Newey gave them that break at that 
16 time, because he recognized that they might have a 
17 problem putting on a case without an expert witness* 
13 In fact; he so ruled and I think they agreed and said 
19 they needed a continuance and it was granted. 
20 At that time it was clearly made known 
21 that formal depositions would be required. The judge 
22 recognized that and set a deadline ten days from then 
23 to designate the expert witnesses and set a discovery 
24 cut off 20 days before trial, all discovery to be 
25 j completed by that time. 
We then designated our expert witness. We 
filed, in accordance with the court's order, a 
designation naming our expert witness. The plaintiff 
didn't. 
They then contacted me and said we would 
like to try and settle this case without incurring 
additional expenses and I told them that's okay, we 
can try to settle the case. We've gone through great 
efforts to try and resolve the matter with them. At 
no time have there been any discussions about that 
since the mediation meeting in Salt Lake several weeks 
ago. There haven't been any ongoing discussions since 
that time. I want the record to be clear that there 
have not been continuing settlement negotiations up to 
today, as was suggested by counsel. That's not the 
case. When we left the attempted mediation in Salt 
Lake everything broke off and that was it. Until the 
court's ruling today there was never another offer 
made by the plaintiff or another request by them to us 
for an offer, or another offer made by us. Excuse me, 
until the hearing with the court on Friday that never 
occurred . 
So to suggest that there has somehow been 
continuing settlement negotiations that justified not 
complying with the court's otder is wrong. There were i 
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not after that. Even if there had been, certainly 
nobody can claim it's reasonable to wait until three 
or four business days before trial to designate an 
expert that they know the other side wants to depose. 
Our position, obviously, is that it would 
be highly prejudicial to Dr. Dickerson to have to 
proceed without knowing what an expert witness on 
standard of care and causation is going to say. 
Additionally, there were six fact witnesses named and 
we don't have any idea what they were supposed to say. 
We had a right to take their depositions, but 
obviously they had to be named early enough for us to 
do tha t. 
With respect to the motion for a 
continuance, this case has been continued at their 
request once before already for the same reason. Dr. 
Dickerson has had this case hanging over his head for 
a long time now. The claim was first made in 1938. 
It involves treatment back in 1986. He's had a 
lawsuit hanging over his head, or a claim hanging over 
his head, for three years now. I don't know that any 
of us really appreciate what that does to a dentist or 
doctor, to have that hanging over his head, but it's 
been extremely disruptive to him and he has a right to 
25 I have the thing end and another continuance at this 
point would be highly prejudicial to him. We 
therefore resist the motion for continuance. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Durbano, any response? 
MR. DURBANO: Finally, Your Honor, I still have 
never heard defense counsel or anyone from the 
defendant's side designate what date settlement offers 
ended or settlement discussions ended and we as 
plaintiff were alerted that settlement is over, 
designate your expert, let's get ready for trial. 
It's just always been a nebulous, well, sometime. I 
think, for the record, defense counsel should be 
required to state what date that occurred. 
Secondly, any prejudice that may come to 
Dr. Dickerson because of an expert being designated, 
the specific name of an expert at least being 
designated three or four days before trial, could 
easily be cured by a very short continuance, while in 
the alternative, without a continuance my clients are 
not only prejudiced, but are out their day in court. 
My clients have suffered, Your Honor, and for the 
record, while it's true Dr. Dickerson has been faced 
with litigation, my clients have been faced with an 
injury that's now permanent. 
That's all. Thank vou. 
THE COURT: Counsel. I'm not unmindful of the 
impact and the effect that this has had on both the 
3 | plaintiff and on the defendant, but I must give a 
4 1 couple of comments from the court's position. 
5' i First of all, this case has been pending a 
6 I long time and I know that that creates wear and tear 
7 I on both parties. More importantly, the court orders 
8 | in regards to discovery cut off dates and designation 
9 I of witnesses was very clear. Both counsel chose to 
10 J engage in informal discussions and settlement and 
11 chose to deviate from the court's record. 
12 Mr. Durbano, you made a comment that at no 
13 point did the defense tell you when the settlement was 
14 cut off and therefore, to a certain extent, you feel 
15 that you should have additional time. But no one 
16 bothered to include the court in this, no one has 
17 bothered to notify the court and indicate that you 
18 were going to deviate from the order that was 
19 existing. The order is specific. It is crystal clear 
20 as to when cut off is to occur and when the witnesses 
21 are to be designated. There's no notice to the court 
22 or indication that you two have decided to do 
23 otherwise and continue your negotiations or continue 
24 on with the case. 
25 In regards to the necessity of an expert, 
this court is of the opinion, from simply reading the 
case from day one, that it would be necessary in a 
malpractice or negligence nature of this suite, 
4 I involving a professional, whether it be a dentist, 
5 lawyer, engineer, that the plaintiff needed an expert 
6 to set out the standard of care or the burden from 
7 which there must be some deviation in order to show 
3 I negligence. 
9 | There was also a ruling on this, when both 
10 counsel thought this was going to go to trial without 
11 an expert and you would be able to use the attending 
12 I dentist, the judge ruled early on in the game that he 
13 was of the opinion that it would be necessary to have 
14 an expert in order for the plaintiff to prevail. 
15 My feeling is, waiting as long as we did, 
16 bringing all the people that we brought here for the 
17 trial, bringing in a judge, everything else, the court 
18 is of the opinion that it's going to enforce the 
19 discovery cut off deadlines that were in place. That 
20 results, I guess, in having the matter dismissed. 
21 I'm denying your request for a 
22 continuance, Mr. Durbano. I don't know how many more 
23 times we can continue it. You can argue we've only 
24 | had one continuance, we only need one more short one, 
25 I but to me it's very clear that the responsibility and 
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burden of providing an expert witness in this case has 
been with the plaintiff from day one on this case. 
And even when plaintiff took the position that perhaps 
she could bet get by without one, the judge ruled that 
you would need an expert. 
Mr. Williams, if you'll prepare the order, 
since your side prevailed in this, I'll sign it. That 
will be all, counsel. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Please submit it to Mr. Durbano for 
approval as to form before you submit it to me. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'll do that. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
(Concluded at 11:15 a.m.) 
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the proceedings in the 
captioned matter were taken before me, Rodney M. 
Felshaw, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
Brigham City, Utah. 
That said proceedings were reported by me in 
stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be trans-
cribed into typewriting; and that a full, true and 
correct transcription is set forth in the foregoing 
pages numbered from 2 to 16, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript 
was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, 
Brigham City, Utah. 
I further certify that I am not associated with 
any of the parties to said matter and that I am not 
interested in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand and official seal at Brigham 
City, Utah, this 30th day of August, 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
January 4, 1992 
Rodney M.(7Felsha^/, 
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